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Abstract
Inflation-indexed bonds are fixed-income securities whose nominal cash flows are adjusted
to an inflation index. In countries where these securities exist, inflation expectations are
sometimes estimated as the spread between the nominal yield on a conventional bond and
the real yield on an indexed bond with a similar maturity and issued in the same currency
and by the same issuer. However, this indicator, known as the break-even rate, may
estimate inflation expectations with some biases. In this paper, we discuss, and quantify
where possible, the size of such biases. Then, focusing on the 10-year French indexed
bond, we compute an alternative indicator, called the inflation compensation measure,
which corrects some of these biases and find very few differences between both indicators
in our sample period. Finally, the comparison with other indicators of long-term inflation
expectations shows that measures based on indexed-bond prices are more time-varying
than non-financial indicators, but less variable than other financial indicators.
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1. Introduction
Inflation-indexed bonds (indexed bonds hereafter) are fixed-income securities whose
nominal cash flows are adjusted to inflation. While nominal payments are known ex-ante in
a conventional bond, and real payments depend on inflation; the opposite occurs in the
case of indexed bonds1.
Indexed-bond markets have traditionally emerged in countries experiencing very high rates
of inflation. In these cases, the issuance of indexed debt by the government has commonly
been aimed at developing long-term capital markets and improving the credibility of anti-
inflation policies. This has been the case, for example, in Israel, Brazil, Mexico or Argentina.
More recently, indexed-bond markets have also emerged in a number of industrialised
countries, with moderate inflation rates and with price stability-oriented monetary policies.
These countries include the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Sweden, the United
States, France and New Zealand, where indexed-bond markets have sought to reduce debt
costs, to complete financial markets and to reinforce the credibility of non-inflationary
policies.
Financing through indexed, as opposed to conventional, bonds may reduce the cost of debt
through different channels. Firstly, if investors demand an inflation-risk premium on
conventional bonds, the issuer of indexed bonds will save this premium in exchange for
bearing the inflation risk. If the issuer is less risk-averse than the investors, the resulting
cost-risk combination must be superior. Secondly, issuing indexed bonds may further
reduce the expected cost of debt if, as appeared to be the case in United Kingdom in 1981,
investors have higher inflation expectations than those of the issuer. Finally, as Barro
(1995) noted, another advantage of issuing theses securities is the greater smoothness of
their real payments in comparison with those of conventional debt.
From the investors’ point of view, the main reason for demanding indexed bonds is to hedge
against inflation risk. For this reason, the main holders of these financial assets are
conservative long-term investors such as pension funds and insurance companies.
Additionally, indexed securities allow for greater portfolio diversification and active
management of inflation expectations. For example, investors with higher (lower) inflation
expectations than the market will overweigh (underweigh) indexed bonds in their portfolios.
For the economic authorities, indexed bonds are also useful due to their information
content. In particular, the prices of these bonds are sometimes used to derive estimates of
real interest rates and market inflation expectations. These non-observable variables are
relevant elements in the assessment of the macroeconomic outlook as determinants of
                                                                
1 In practice, however, some characteristics of indexed bonds imply that the real cash-flow of indexed bonds may also
depend on the evolution of inflation, albeit to a lesser extent than in the case of conventional bonds.
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economic agents’ saving and expenditure decisions. In the case of market inflation-
expectations, they are also useful for the monetary authorities as an indicator of the
credibility of price stability. Against this background, one advantage of using indexed-bond
prices for the estimation of inflation expectations is that they readily provide daily
information. This makes them very attractive for regular monetary policy assessment and
for timely evaluation of the credibility that the market accords to price stability, in
comparison with alternative methods such as those based on opinion surveys or
econometric analysis.
In countries where indexed bonds exist, the most widely used measure of inflation
expectations derived from bond markets is the spread between the nominal yield on a
conventional bond and the real yield on an indexed bond with a similar maturity, the same
issuer and denominated in the same currency. However, this indicator, which is habitually
referred to as the break-even inflation rate, may measure inflation expectations with an error
due to the effect of, among other things, imperfect indexation, taxes, inflation risk and
liquidity premia.
Alternative and more sophisticated methods to estimate inflation expectations using prices
of indexed bonds have appeared in the literature. For example, Deacon and Derry (1994)
proposed the estimation of an Inflation Term Structure for the British indexed-bond market.
More recently, Sack (2001) proposed an alternative indicator, which he called Inflation
Compensation Measure, for the US indexed-bond market.
Against this background, in this paper we discuss, and quantify where possible, the size of
the biases included in the break-even rate for the estimation of inflation expectations. Then,
focusing on the French indexed-bond market, we evaluate the applicability of alternative
methodologies for estimating inflation expectations. Finally, we compare alternative
indicators of long-term inflation expectations. We focus on French indexed bonds since they
are the only such instruments issued by governments in the euro area, and their information
content is regularly exploited by the European Central Bank in its regular assessment of
inflation expectations for the euro area.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the functioning of the
French inflation-indexed bond market. Section 3 discusses the biases of the break-even
rate for the estimation of inflation expectations. Section 4 evaluates alternative measures of
inflation expectations using the French 10-year indexed-bond prices. Section 5 compares
different indicators of inflation expectations for the French economy and, finally, the last
section draws the main conclusions.
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2. The structure of inflation-indexed bonds
2.1. General issues
Indexed bonds are fixed-income securities whose nominal cash flows are adjusted by the
performance of an inflation index. While nominal cash flows of conventional bonds are
known ex-ante, they are uncertain for indexed bonds. By contrast, real cash flows are only
certain for indexed bonds, provided they are perfectly indexed to inflation and inflation
compensation gains are not taxed.
The real yield (r) on an indexed bond is computed in the same way as the nominal yield on
a conventional bond, but using real flows instead of nominal ones (nominal payments are
not known ex-ante). More precisely, the real yield is obtained implicitly from the following
expression:
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where Pt is the price of the indexed bond, c is the real coupon rate, and N is the term to
maturity (years).
The most widespread class of indexed bonds are capital-indexed bonds 2 employed, for
instance, in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United
States and France. These bonds pay a periodic coupon, which is the result of applying a
fixed real coupon to the inflation-adjusted principal. And, at maturity, the inflation-adjusted
principal is paid.
The reference price index employed for the adjustment of the bond’s principal usually
coincides with a consumer price index. This type of index is particularly appropriate since it
provides inflation coverage for a wide group of investors and it is published regularly, with a
short lag and minor revisions. Additionally, a highly reputable institution independent of the
issuer is, in most cases, the provider of the price index.
The adjustment of the principal of the bond requires a daily reference of the price index,
which obviously is not available contemporaneously. For this reason, the daily reference
index is computed using past values of the price index. The time lag between the updating
date and the date of the price index employed is known as the inflation lag of the indexed
bond. Many countries like Canada, the United States, Sweden or France apply an inflation
                                                                
2 See Deacon and Derry (1997) for a description of other alternatives, such as interest-indexed bonds, current pay bonds ,
indexed-annuity bonds , indexed zero-coupon bonds .
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lag of 3 months. But there are cases, such as the British Indexed-Linked Gilts, for which the
lag is longer (8 months in the British case) due to the rules applied to accrued interest.
Finally, the taxation on indexed bonds may be levied on nominal or real returns. In the first
case, the inflation compensation gain is taxed, and hence the protection against inflation is
reduced. If, alternatively, only real yields are taxed, as in the British case, then after-tax real
cash flows are certain, increasing the attractiveness of these bonds for inflation risk-averse
investors subject to taxes.
2.2. The inflation-indexed French government bonds: OATis
The French Treasury is currently the only sovereign issuer of indexed bonds in the euro
area. It started issuing a 10-year bond (OATi 3% 07/2009) in September 1998, and placed a
second line of 30-year bonds (OATi 3.40% 07/2029) in September 1999. Since then, these
capital-indexed bonds have been tapped regularly and in March 2001 their outstanding
amount reached €9.5 and €3.6 billion, respectively. These amounts are quite small
compared with that of the 10-year conventional bond used for the calculation of the break-
even rate (OAT 4% 04/2009), which was €20.2 billion on the same date. Nevertheless, the
differences have been narrowing over recent months due to the buy-backs of the
conventional bond carried out by the French Treasury and new issues of the indexed bonds
(see Figure 1).
The daily price reference used to adjust the nominal cash flows is based on the non-
seasonally adjusted French consumer price index (CPI), excluding tobacco, which is
published by the French Institute for National Statistics every month. The annual payment of
the coupon is computed as follows:
Coupont =Real Coupon Rate x Nominal x Index Ratiot
Index Ratiot =
indexBase
referencepriceDaily t .
The nominal value of the bond is €1 and the coupon is 3% for the 10-year issue and 4% for
the 30-year one. The Base index is the value of the price index on the accrual date (25 July
1998, in the case of the 10-year issue), and the Daily price reference on day t of month m is
calculated by linear interpolation of two monthly price indices:
Daily price referencet= )( 323 --- -+ mm
m
m CPICPIND
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CPI ,
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where CPIi is the consumer price index of month i, nbd is the number of days since the start
of the month up to day d, and NDi is the number of days in month i. Note that CPIm-2 is
always published before the end of month m-1 and is therefore available to calculate the
Daily price reference for each day of month m.
The calculation of accrued interest is similar to that of conventional bonds:
Accrued interestt=Real Coupon Rate x Index Ratiot x Nominal x 
periodcoupontheindays
accrueddays
.
At maturity, bond holders receive the inflation-adjusted principal, which is computed as the
product of the nominal value and the index ratio provided this ratio is higher than one,
otherwise (i.e. in the event of deflation) the par value is guaranteed.
The tax treatment of French indexed bonds is very similar to that of conventional French-
government bonds. French-resident retail investors pay taxes on both coupon interest
income and capital gains, including those derived from the inflation compensation, which
are paid when they are realised. These investors are also entitled to opt for a final and
definitive one-off flat-rate withholding tax of 25%. If they choose not to do so, income from
these bonds must be declared together with their taxable income. Institutional investors are
also taxed on interests received but the redemption premium generated by indexation of the
principal may be taxed partly before divestment or maturity, even though the premium is not
yet received. And finally, non-resident investors are exempt from the one-off flat-rate
withholding tax.
In the secondary market, primary dealers have market-maker responsibilities in respect of
this new security to ensure the transparency and liquidity of the market. In the future, OATis
could possibly be eligible for both stripping and repo operations.
3. Measuring inflation expectations using the break-even inflation rate
3.1. The break-even inflation rate
The break-even inflation rate (break-even rate, hereafter) is generally defined as the spread
between the nominal yield on a long-term conventional bond and the real yield on an
indexed bond issued with a similar maturity, the same issuer and the same currency of
denomination. In the French case, the 10-year break-even rate is currently computed using
the conventional and indexed bonds maturing in April and July 2009, respectively. As Figure
2 shows, the yield on the 10-year French indexed bond has trended in a much more stable
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way than that on the 10-year conventional bond.3 As a consequence, movements in the
yield on the conventional bond are mostly transmitted to the break-even rate. During the
period considered in Figure 2, this rate ranged from 0.7% to 2%, with a mean value of 1.5%.
The yield on the indexed bond ranged from 2.7% to 3.9%, with a mean value of 3.4%.
The break-even rate is the rate of inflation that would approximately equalise the total return
on an indexed bond with that on a conventional bond. Under some assumptions this
indicator is an unbiased estimator of average inflation expectations over the remaining life
of the bonds. Section 3.2 discusses these assumptions and analyses the impact of relaxing
them.
3.2.  Biases
To discuss the biases associated with the use of the break-even rate as a measure of
inflation expectations, we first introduce an initial scenario, called scenario 1, with a number
of simplifying assumptions. Later, we introduce new scenarios relaxing the initial
assumptions. In each scenario we derive an analytical expression for the bias and, in some
cases, we try to give estimates of this bias or simulate it for different combinations of
parameters.
Scenario 1: A simple (but unrealistic) world
In this initial scenario we introduce the following six simplifying assumptions: i) the inflation
compensation of the indexed bond coincides with the contemporaneous realised inflation
(there is no inflation lag), ii) returns on bonds are tax-free, iii) investors are risk-neutral, iv)
both bonds have the same degree of market liquidity, v) both bonds are zero-coupon
securities with an identical maturity date, and vi) inflation compensation is symmetric (same
treatment of inflation and deflation).
Under assumptions i-vi the real yield on the indexed bond will be equal to the real rate of
interest demanded by investors for the time to maturity of the bond. Given that investors are
risk-neutral, the conventional bond will only include a compensation for the expected
inflation in addition to the real rate remuneration. That is to say, the following equation must
hold:
(1+ i)=(1+p)(1+r) (1)
                                                                
3 Throughout this paper information on conventional bond prices and yields is taken from Bloomberg, whereas information
on the indexed bond is taken from Reuters due to the existence of missing data at Bloomberg for this security.
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where i is the yield on the nominal bond, p is the expected inflation rate and r is the real
rate of interest. This is the simple version of the Fisher identity that holds assuming risk-
neutrality.4
After some algebra, equation (1) can be rewritten as
prpr ++=i  (2)
Taking into account that in this case the real yield on the indexed bond (r) is equal to the
real rate of interest, the break-even inflation rate will be:
prp +=- ri  (3)
In other words, in this simple world the break-even rate is an upward-biased estimator of
inflation expectations provided that inflation expectations are positive. The bias, which will
be referred to as the compound bias, is equal to pr. However, for small values of p and r
the bias will be very small and, as a consequence, the break-even rate will be a good
approximation of the expected inflation rate. For instance, if the real rate of interest is 4%
and the expected inflation rate is 2% the bias will only be 8 basis points (b.p.).
It is worth noting that, due to the compound effect, changes in the break-even rate will also
overstate changes in inflation expectations by a factor of one plus the real rate of interest
(see expression (3)).
In any case, it is straightforward to see that in this simple world an unbiased estimator of the
expected inflation rate can be recovered using the expression (i-r)/(1+r).
In the absence of indexed bonds, changes in long-term inflation expectations are
sometimes approximated by changes in yields on long-term conventional bonds. A
comparison between equations (2) and (3) shows that, under the assumptions of scenario
1, the break-even rate captures more accurately the changes in inflation expectations only if
the real rate of interest is time-varying. The higher the variability of the real rate of interest,
the better the relative performance of the break-even rate in comparison with the yield on
the nominal bond to measure changes in inflation expectations.
                                                                
4 Note that in equation (1) there is no mention of the time to maturity. Hence variables i, p and r reflect the cumulative rates
between now and the maturity. Alternatively, equation (1) can be applied to variables expressed on an annual basis by simply
taking the time to maturity power to both sides. In this case p should be interpreted as the annual rate of the expected
cumulative inflation between now and the redemption date of the bonds. The interpretation of p as annual inflation
expectations is affected by the Jensen inequality.
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Scenario 2: Introducing an inflation lag
In this scenario we relax assumption i). In particular, we assume that indexed-bond holders
are compensated using a lagged measure of inflation instead of contemporaneous inflation.
Under this assumption, the following simple Fisher identity must hold in the indexed-bond
market:
)1)(1()1)(1( rpp ++=++ lr  (4)
where p l stands for the expected lagged inflation. It is worth noting that the yield on the
indexed bond will cease to be equal to the real rate of interest provided that the lagged and
contemporaneous expected inflation are different. In particular, the real yield on the indexed
bond will be higher (lower) than the real rate of interest if the lagged expected inflation is
lower (higher) than the contemporaneous expected inflation. This is because investors
would require a positive (negative) premium to compensate them for the expected under-
(over-) compensation for inflation.
In the nominal-bond market, the Fisher identity (1) will be unchanged. Solving equation (4)
for r and using (2), the following expression is given for the break-even rate:
)1(
1
r
p
pp
prp +
+
-
++=-
l
lri (5)
In this case the break-even rate includes an additional bias reflecting the relative
discrepancy between the lagged and the contemporaneous expected inflation rates. The
sign of the bias will depend on the term structure of inflation expectations. In particular, the
sign will be positive (negative) if inflation between t-l and t is expected to be higher (lower)
than inflation between T-l and T, where t indicates the current period and T is the
redemption date of the bond.5 In practice, the absolute value of the bias will depend directly
on the relative length of the lag in comparison with the time to maturity of the bond. In the
French case the lag length is three months, which seems small compared to the 10-year
maturity of the bond. With the aim of evaluating empirically the significance of this bias, we
have computed the first factor of the last term on the right-hand side of equation (5) for the
French indexed bond. Instead of inflation expectations we have used average inflation over
a 10-year horizon with data from 1960 to 2000. An average absolute value of 2 b.p. and a
maximum absolute value of 7 b.p. is obtained, suggesting that the bias produced by the
inflation lag is very small in the French case.
                                                                
5 This result can be reached ignoring the problems caused by the Jensen inequality.
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Scenario 3: Introducing taxes
In this scenario we relax assumption ii) and keep the other assumptions of scenario 1
unchanged. In particular, we introduce two different taxes: one is applied to the interest
income and the other to the inflation compensation gain. Let t1 and t2 be, respectively, the
rates of these taxes for the marginal investor. In this case, the Fisher identities for the
conventional and indexed-bond markets turn out to be:
)1)(1())1(1( 1 rp ++=-+ ti  (6)
)1)(1()1))(1(1( 21 rppp ++=-+-+ ttr  (7)
Note that now the left hand side of the Fisher identities reflect the after-tax expected
nominal gross return. Similarly, r should be interpreted as the after-tax real rate of interest.
Solving equation (6) for i, we get:
p
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Solving (7) for r and using (8) we obtain the following expression for the break-even rate:
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The second and third terms on the right-hand side of expression (9) capture the bias
produced when measuring inflation expectations using the break-even rate in the presence
of taxes. The first term of them is the compound bias, which has been discussed previously.
It is positive and higher than in the case of no taxes provided inflation expectations are
positive. The last term captures the error caused by the existence of taxes and will be
referred to as the tax bias. This bias will be positive (negative) if t2 is lower (higher) than
t1(1+p) and the inflation expectations are positive. In practice, it will normally be positive
since the marginal tax rate on inflation compensation gains is not higher than that of the
interest income. Therefore, the introduction of taxes tends to increase the upward bias of
the break-even rate in measuring the level of inflation expectations even when the marginal
tax rates are the same (t1=t2=t).
Note that changes in the break even rate overestimate changes in inflation expectations
due to tax effects provided inflation expectations are positive and the marginal tax rate on
inflation compensation gains is not higher than that of the interest income (see expression
(9)). However, a comparison between (8) and (9) shows that this bias will generally be
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higher when using changes in the conventional bond yield. In other words, the existence of
taxes improves the relative performance of the break-even rate to capture changes in
inflation expectations in comparison with the yield on the nominal bond provided that
compensation gains are taxed.
Table 1 shows the bias in using the break-even rate to estimate the level of inflation
expectations for different combinations of parameters t1, t2 and p. The marginal tax rate on
interest income, t1, is set between 0% and 40%, the marginal tax rate on inflation
compensation gains, t2, is set to be a proportion of the previous tax rate (between 0% and
100%), and inflation expectations range from 0% to 5%. Biases are computed using
expression (9) assuming that the real rate of interest is 3.5%. In the absence of taxes the
bias (compound bias) appears to be very small (between 0 and 18 b.p.). The introduction of
taxes increases the bias up to a maximum of 363 b.p. when the marginal tax rate is 40%,
inflation compensation gains are not taxed and inflation expectations are 5%. Obviously this
is an extreme assumption, but it is useful for illustrating the high potential effects of taxes
when estimating inflation expectations using the break-even rate. When the marginal rate
on inflation compensation gains is set at 50% of that on the interest income, the maximum
bias diminishes to 204 b.p. Finally, when both tax rates are equal the maximum bias is only
45 b.p.
Table 1 also shows, for the same combinations of parameters, the bias in the sensitivity of
the estimated changes in inflation expectations when using both the changes of the break-
even rate and the changes in the yield on the nominal bond. When inflation compensation
gains are not taxed, the sensitivity reaches a maximum value of 1.73 times for both the yield
on the nominal bond and the break-even rate, i.e. an increase in inflation expectations of
100 points is reflected in an increase of 173 points in the estimated change in inflation
expectations. This bias is reduced in the case of the break-even rate when the inflation
compensation gains are taxed, whereas it remains unchanged in the case of the yield on
the nominal bond. For instance, when both tax rates are set at the same level, the
sensitivity reaches a maximum value of 1.09 times.
The relative extensiveness length of the ranges of the estimated biases in Table 1 suggests
the importance of the estimation of marginal tax rates to assess accurately the biases of the
break-even rate in measuring inflation expectations.
Unfortunately, marginal tax rates are not normally observed due to the existence of
investors with different tax rates. Therefore, it will be difficult in practice to control for the tax
bias. In the French case, given that compensation gains and interest income are equally
taxed, we might think that the impact of taxes on the bias of the break-even rate would be
limited. In particular, according to the results of Table 1, for a marginal tax rate of 40%
(which is approximately the maximum applied to French investors) the tax bias would be
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lower than 7 b.p. for expected inflation below 2%6. However, the marginal tax rates will not
necessarily be equal even if, at individual level, both sources of income are equally taxed.
Additionally, it is possible that some non-resident investors may be subject to a two-rate tax
system. As a consequence, the tax bias might be much higher than that estimated
previously.
Scenario 4: Introducing risk aversion
In this scenario we relax assumption iii) and keep the other assumptions of scenario 1
unchanged. In this case, investors in the conventional bond would demand a compensation
for bearing inflation risk and the Fisher identity in this market would be:
)1)(1()1( ni grp +++=+  (10)
where gn stands for the inflation risk premium. Conversely, the yield on the indexed bond
does not include this compensation since it offers a real return without uncertainty and, as a
consequence, the yield on this bond will continue to be the real rate of interest.
Solving (10) for i we have:
)1( nni grpgr ++++=  (11)
Taking into account equation (11) and r=r, the following expression for the break-even rate
is derived:
pgrgp )( nnri +++=-  (12)
Equation (12) shows that the introduction of risk-averse investors tends to increase the
upward bias of the break-even rate as a measure of the level of inflation expectations in
comparison with scenario 1. The sensitivity of changes to inflation expectations also
increases in comparison with scenario 1.
The empirical evidence on inflation risk premia suggests that they are not negligible
although they are relatively stable. For instance, Alonso and Ayuso (1996) report inflation
risk premia in the Spanish bond market between 20 b.p. and 40 b.p. for a 5-year horizon.
                                                                
6 As Table 1 shows, when the tax rates are both at 40% and the expected inflation is 2%, the bias is 14 b.p., but up to 7 b.p.
correspond to the compound bias.
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Scenario 5: Introducing different degrees of liquidity
In this scenario we relax assumption iv) and keep the other assumptions. In particular, we
assume that the indexed bond has a lower degree of liquidity compared to the conventional
bond. This is a realistic assumption since a relatively high proportion of indexed bond
holders tend to keep these assets until maturity, which is reflected in relatively low trading
volumes. For instance, in the French case the turnover of the 10-year indexed bond was, in
1999, around 100 times lower than that of the nominal bond used to compute the break-
even rate.
In the indexed-bond market, investors demand compensation for bearing higher liquidity risk
(i.e. the risk of not finding a counterparty or having to incur higher transaction costs in the
event of selling before maturity). The Fisher identity for the indexed bond is:
)1)(1()1)(1( ir grpp +++=++  (13)
where gi stands for the liquidity premium. Solving (13) for r and using equation (2) we obtain
the following expression for the break-even rate:
rpgp +-=- iri  (14)
Equation (14) shows that the existence of a liquidity premium in the indexed-bond market
tends to understate the level of expected inflation derived from the break-even rate. By
contrast, this premium does not affect the sensitivity of the break-even rate to changes in
inflation expectations.
Under the assumptions of this scenario, the relative performance in changes of the break-
even rate in comparison with changes in the nominal bond yield to capture changes in
inflation expectations depends on the relative volatility of the real rate of interest in
comparison with the volatility of the liquidity premium. In particular, the measure derived
from the break-even rate will only be a better proxy for changes in inflation expectations if
the real rate of interest is more volatile than the liquidity premium.
To approximate the importance of liquidity premia in the French market we have compared
the implied interest rates quoted on the bond market with those quoted on the STRIP
market, the latter having a lower degree of liquidity. We approximate the liquidity premium
as the difference between the implied interest rates in both markets. To do this, we estimate
zero-coupon yield curves in both markets using the Nelson and Siegel model with daily
frequency between September 1998 and May 2001. Figure 3 shows the average difference
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between both curves together with the 5% and 95% percentile values. At the short end of
the curve (up to 2.5 years), the average difference appears to be positive up to a maximum
of 5 b.p. As Clermont-Tonnerre (1993) documented, this result is not consistent with the
existence of a liquidity premium in the STRIPs market and may be attributed to a relative
excess of demand at the short end of the STRIPs market due to the behaviour of
guaranteed mutual funds. For horizons longer than 2.5 years the average difference
between the curves turns out to be negative, as expected. However, the value of the
average difference is almost negligible (around 1 b.p.) and the 95% percentile is always
positive. These results suggest the existence of very low liquidity premia in the STRIPs
market. Additionally, the existence of other effects such as imbalances between supply and
demand in the STRIPs market may also distort the estimation of these premia.
Scenario 6: Relaxing simultaneously a number of assumptions
In this scenario we relax at the same time assumptions i-iv in order to analyse the
interactions between the different assumptions. For instance, the existence of both taxes on
inflation gains and an inflation lag means that the indexed bond is no longer an inflation risk-
free asset; and, in a context where investors are risk-averse, indexed-bond holders would
demand compensation for bearing this risk.
The Fisher identities for the conventional and the indexed bonds are, respectively:
)1)(1())1(1( 1 nti grp +++=-+  (15)
)1)(1()1))(1(1( 21 ill ttr grppp +++=-+-+  (16)
Note that in this case gi includes both a liquidity and an inflation risk premium. The latter will
generally be smaller than the inflation risk premium demanded on conventional bonds since
the inflation risk for the indexed bond will also be smaller.
Solving (15) for i, we have:
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and solving (16) for r and using (17), we have the following expression for the break-even
rate:
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In expression (18) we see that when assumptions i-iv are relaxed, the bias of the break-
even rate in measuring the level of inflation expectations can be broken down into five
components. These components are: a) the inflation-risk premium of the nominal bond, b)
the (liquidity and inflation-risk premia) of the indexed bond, c) the compound error, d) the
tax effect and e) the inflation lag effect. It is interesting to see that the marginal tax rate on
interest income affects all five components. In particular, the higher this tax rate the higher
the absolute value of any of these components. Also, the inflation lag not only appears in
the last term but also affects the second and fourth terms.
Scenario 7: Introducing coupon bonds
In this scenario we consider a more realistic case in which conventional and indexed bonds
are coupon bonds whose maturity dates could be different (i.e. we relax assumption v and
keep the other assumptions of scenario 1).
As is well known, the yield on a conventional coupon bond does not coincide with the
interest rate at the horizon of its term to maturity, unless the nominal term structure is flat.
Something similar applies in the case of indexed bonds for real rates of interest –i.e. the
real yield does not coincide with the real rate of interest at the horizon of its term to maturity,
unless the real term structure is flat. Therefore, the break-even rate is implicitly assuming
that both the nominal and real term structures are flat - and therefore that the term structure
of the expected inflation is also flat. This assumption will generally not be satisfied and the
break-even rate will estimate inflation expectations with a bias that we will refer to as the
coupon bias.
In order to analyse the sign and size of the coupon bias it is useful to approximate the
(nominal and real) yield to maturity as the interest rate at the horizon of the duration of the
bond. Applying this approximation to the conventional and indexed bonds, and using the
Fisher identity, we can rewrite the break-even rate as:
)()( didcTdididiT iirri -+-++»- pppp                                     (19)
where pm and rm are the inflation expectations and (zero-coupon) real interest rate at a m-
horizon, respectively, for m={T,dc,di}; T is the horizon for which inflation expectations are
measured, dc is the duration of the conventional bond and di is the duration of the indexed
bond7. The last three terms of expression (19) approximate the bias incurred when
computing the break-even rate with coupon bonds. The first one, (pdi ric), is the result of the
compound effect. And the other two, (pdi - pT)+(idc - idi), reflect the coupon bias. The first term
of the coupon bias (pdi-pT) depends on the slope of the term structure of the expected
                                                                
7 The duration of the indexed bond is computed in the conventional way using the real cash flows.
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inflation. More specifically, it is negative (positive) with an upward (downward) slope since
dc is lower than T, and its absolute value increases with the absolute value of the slope.
This term will only be zero if the inflation term structure is assumed to be flat –i.e. parallel
nominal and real term structures.
The second term of the coupon bias (idc-idi) depends on both the duration of the bonds and
the slope of the nominal term structure. This term will be zero if the nominal term structure
is flat, as the break-even rate implicitly assumes, or if, alternatively, the duration of both
bonds is the same. If the duration of the indexed bond is higher than that of the
conventional bond, this term will be positive (negative) for a downward (upward) sloping
nominal term structure, whereas the opposite sign will appear if the duration of the indexed
bond is lower than that of the conventional bond.
Hence, if the nominal and real term structures are flat, as the break-even rate implicitly
assumes, there is no coupon bias. If these term structures are parallel, but not flat, - i.e. if
the inflation term structure is flat - the coupon bias will depend on the duration of the
indexed and conventional bond and on the slope of the nominal term structure, and it can
be approximated by (idc-idi). When the inflation term is not flat, an additional term will appear
in the coupon bias that can be approximated by (pdi-pT).
To estimate the importance of the coupon bias we have carried out a simulation exercise
assuming different combinations of nominal and real interest rate term structures. Note that
the term structure of expected inflation is implicitly defined given the nominal and real term
structures. In particular, the expected inflation rate for a m-horizon will be pm=(im- rm )/(1+rm),
where im is the nominal zero-coupon yield at a m-horizon. More specifically, six scenarios
for nominal interest rates and three for real rates are considered. In all of them the term
structure of interest rates is assumed to follow the Nelson and Siegel model, i.e.
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where ym is the m-horizon instantaneous interest rate (nominal or real). The scenarios
considered impose b2=0 (i.e. yield curves are monotonous), t=48 and combine different
values for parameters bo, which captures the long-term interest rate (asymptotic value), and
b1, which captures the (opposite of the) slope of the term structure. In all real interest rate
scenarios the long-term interest rate is set at 3.5%, a value which is close to the average
observed yield on the French indexed bond since its launch. Scenario 1 of nominal interest
rates approximately reflects the average observed level of the estimated zero-coupon yield
                                                                
8 This corresponds approximately to the average estimated value for this parameter for the nominal interest rate term
structure in the French market between September 1998 and May 2001.
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curve. For each combination of nominal and real interest rate structures the coupon bias is
computed as the difference between the break-even rate adjusted for the compound effect9
and the implied inflation expectation at a 10-year horizon. The break-even rate is computed
using the characteristics of the French 10-year conventional and indexed bonds in July
1999 (i.e. 10 years before maturity).
As Table 2 reports, the sign and size of the coupon bias mainly depends on the implied
slope of the term structure of the expected inflation. This reflects the fact that both bonds
have a very similar duration: around 8.1 years and 8.7 years for the conventional and
indexed bond, respectively. The bias only reaches relative high values (-32 b.p. and 38 b.p.)
when the slope of the term structure of expected inflation is supposed to be high in absolute
terms also (9 pp. and –9 pp., respectively). Conversely, when the expected inflation is flat
(same slope in the nominal and real interest rate curves) the bias is very low. Finally, when
we take the nominal rates that reflect the recent period (scenario 1) the bias ranges from –4
b.p. (when we assume a flat inflation term structure) to –17 b.p.
Scenario 8: Introducing asymmetry in inflation compensation
Sometimes, as is the case in France, the par value of indexed bonds is guaranteed at
maturity, introducing asymmetry in the compensation for inflation (i.e. assumption vi does
not hold). The existence of such asymmetry means that the bond includes a put option. If
this option is priced the bond will have a higher price (lower yield) than that of an otherwise
identical bond with symmetric compensation. As a consequence of this effect, the break-
even rate will overestimate inflation expectations. The size of this bias will be higher the
greater the likelihood of deflation over the horizon of the residual life of the bond. In the
French case, the lack of historical negative figures for inflation over horizons of 10 years
suggests that the likelihood of deflation is very low, and, as a consequence, the size of the
bias caused by the asymmetry of compensation for inflation should also be very low.
Summary of results
To sum up, in this section we have shown that the break-even rate may measure inflation
expectations with an error. Table 3 summarises the main biases that this indicator could
have. In particular, the sign of the bias and an estimation of its size, in the case of the 10-
year French bond, are shown.
                                                                
9 This correction is made in order to isolate the coupon bias from the compound bias.
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4. Improving the information content of the break-even rate
In the previous section we have discussed different sources of errors associated with the
use of the break-even rate as a measure of market inflation expectations. We have also
seen that the size and sign of the joint impact of these biases is difficult to establish. The
literature on indexed bonds has provided some methodologies to overcome some of these
problems, especially regarding the inflation-lag and coupon biases. In this section, we
discuss the applicability and added value of these alternative measures of inflation
expectations for the 10-year French indexed bond.
One simple approach to eliminate the impact of the inflation lag in the estimation of
expected inflation has consisted of introducing inflation expectations over the lagging period
in the calculation of the real yield. An iterative procedure is then used aimed at achieving
consistency between the inflation expectations over the lagging period and the break-even
rate. More recently, Evans (1998) has proposed an alternative framework to deal with the
inflation lag based on a no-arbitrage relation between nominal and indexed bonds. Both
methods have mainly been employed for the British indexed bonds due to their relatively
long inflation lag (eight months). For the French case, as we saw in Section 3, the impact of
the inflation lag is negligible.
The break-even rate is normally computed using bonds with different maturities, and as was
argued in Section 3, different cash-flow structures, both causing coupon bias. One
alternative considered in the literature has involved comparing bonds with a similar duration,
instead of a similar maturity. But this alternative has been rejected by some authors
because the nature of the interest rate risk differs for nominal and indexed bonds (see
Bootle (1991)). Another, more refined, approach for dealing with coupon bias has consisted
of the estimation of an implied forward inflation rate curve, commonly known as Inflation
Term Structure or ITS. The ITS is obtained as the difference between the forward rates of
nominal and real yield curves. One of the advantages of this procedure lies in the fact that it
uses information of the whole market, avoiding the bond-specific distortions of the break-
even rate. Deacon and Derry (1994) proposed this methodology for the British market,
fitting a real and nominal yield curve with a parametric model and employing an iterative
process to deal with the inflation lag10. The Bank of England employed it in some Inflation
Reports (see, for example, Bank of England (1994)). More recently, Anderson and Sleath
(2001) have also followed the same approach but using the framework proposed by Evans
(1998) to control the inflation lag and a spline-based technique to fit the yield curves.
                                                                
10 The real yield curve is re-estimated until consistency between the assumed ITS and the estimated ITS is achieved. The
initial assumption is a flat inflation rate.
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Unfortunately, this methodology cannot be applied to the French market, given the limited
supply of indexed bonds.
Alternatively, Sack (2000), focusing on the U.S. 10-year indexed bond (TIPS11), proposed
an alternative measure, which he called inflation compensation measure. This takes into
account the structure of payments of the bonds but does not require fitting a real yield
curve. The inflation compensation measure is defined as the constant rate, p, needed to
adjust the principal of the indexed bond so that the present value of the nominal coupon and
principal payments are equal to the price of the indexed bond. More formally,
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where N is the term to maturity (in years) of the bond, c is the annual fixed real coupon rate,
and dt(i) is the discount function associated with the nominal term structure of interest rates.
It can be proved that the inflation compensation measure is an unbiased estimator of
market inflation expectations under the following assumptions: i) flat inflation expectations,
ii) no tax effects, iii) zero inflation-risk premium12, iv) indexed bonds have the same degree
of liquidity as bonds employed for fitting the nominal yield curve. To see this, note first that if
inflation expectations are constant over the life of the indexed bond (assumption i) at a rate
p, and ignoring the inflation lag effect, the right-hand side of expression (21) gives the price
of a portfolio of bonds that matches the expected cash flows of the indexed bond. And
under assumptions iii) and iv) the price of this portfolio should be the same as that of the
indexed bond in order to avoid arbitrage opportunities.
Then, the inflation compensation measure improves the break-even rate in some aspects.
Firstly, it controls part of the coupon bias since it relaxes the assumption included in the
break-even rate of flat nominal term structure. However, as in the case of the break-even
rate, this measure also assumes a flat inflation term structure – or parallel nominal and real
term structures – and therefore it does not completely eliminate the coupon effect. Looking
back to the discussion of the coupon bias in Section 3, we know that the part of the coupon
bias corrected with this measure will depend on the differences in duration of the
conventional and indexed bonds, which are very small in the French case. Therefore, the
improvement on this matter will be small.
Secondly, the inflation compensation measure avoids any bias caused by idiosyncratic
factors of the nominal bond used to compute the break-even rate. Thirdly, if the nominal
yield curve employed to discount the expected cash flows has similar liquidity to that of
                                                                
11 Treasury inflation-protected securities.
12 Note that under assumptions i) and iii) the inflation lag does not introduce any additional bias.
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indexed bonds, the inflation compensation measure also controls the liquidity bias. In this
regard, Sack (2000) fitted the nominal yield curve using the prices of Treasury STRIPS
assuming that these securities and indexed bonds have a similar degree of liquidity. And,
finally, by definition the inflation compensation measure does not include a compound bias.
We derive the inflation compensation measure for the French market, applying expression
(21) to the 10-year French indexed bond and using the zero-coupon yield curve fitted with
French conventional bonds13 as discount function. This inflation compensation measure,
oati
convp , proves to be very similar to the break-even rate, with the differences always below 10
b.p. (see Figure 4). Hence, in this sample, the joint impact of the biases corrected by the
inflation compensation measure is not very important.
In order to quantify these biases separately we break down the difference between the
break-even rate and the inflation compensation measure oaticonvp  into three components:
BiasCouponEffectticIdiosyncraBiasCompoundBreakeven oaticonv ++=- p
The Compound Effect is calculated as the difference between the break-even rate and the
rate adjusted for the compound effect (r(i-r)/(1+r)). The Idiosyncratic Effect captures the
specific distortions caused by the particular 10-year nominal bond employed to compute the
break-even rate. In order to approximate this component we compute a compensation
measure ( oatconvp ) applying (21) to the 10-year nominal bond, in the same way as we did for
the indexed bond. Note that in this case the compensation measure captures the yield error
of the bond associated with fitting a zero-coupon yield curve. Finally, the part of the Coupon
Bias corrected by the inflation compensation measure is computed as a residual, assuming
that potential premia due to liquidity, tax effects and inflation risk, included in both
measures, cancel one another out.
The Compound Effect proves to be small and stable and, in this sample, it implies an
overestimation of inflation expectations in the break-even rate of 4 b.p. on average (see
Figure 5). The part of Coupon Bias that is corrected by the inflation compensation measure
proves to be very stable around -4 b.p. The course and size of this effect is consistent to the
results in Section 3 given that the differences in the duration of the indexed and
conventional bonds are very small. In Sack (2000), this bias also accounts for less than 5
b.p., but in his case it is strongly influenced by changes in the references used to compute
the break-even rate14. Finally, the Idiosyncratic Effect is also small but more volatile, ranging
from –6 to 4 b.p. The development of this component seems to be related to the benchmark
                                                                
13 We fit a Nelson-Siegel model for the estimation of the yield curve and minimise price errors weighted by duration.
14 The on-the-run nominal security, employed for the break-even rate in the American case, is auctioned quarterly (with
some reopenings), while new indexed bonds are issued annually.
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status of the nominal bond used in the break-even rate. For example, from November 1998
to June 1999, the bond acted as a benchmark in the French market, and, hence, its yield
included a negative liquidity premium in relation to the remaining conventional bonds. This
introduced a negative bias into the break-even rate that implied an underestimation of
expected inflation. From November 1999, the Idiosyncratic Effect was mainly positive due to
the loose of the liquidity of the conventional bond.
The compensation measure oaticonvp probably still incorporates a liquidity premium because,
unlike in Sack (2000), the expected payments have been discounted using the zero-coupon
yield curve of conventional bonds. However, we have seen in Section 3 that the impact of
liquidity on the estimation of inflation expectations with the break-even rate seems to be
small when we evaluate liquidity differences through the STRIPs yield curve. To confirm
this, we compute the compensation measure using the STRIPs yield curve, as in Sack
(2000), oatistripsp . The difference between these alternative compensation measures, 
oati
convp  and
oati
stripsp  will be a good approximation of the liquidity bias included in the inflation
compensation measure oaticonvp  if STRIPs and conventional bond markets differ solely in their
degree of liquidity, and if the liquidity of STRIPs is similar to that of indexed bonds. As
Figure 7 shows, the liquidity bias is, as expected, very small, and in some intervals of the
sample its sign is even negative, indicating a potential negative liquidity premium. These
results may be related to the existence of very small liquidity premia or, alternatively, to the
fact that prices of STRIPs reflect additional factors, other than liquidity, such as clientele
effects, related to the specific nature of these securities (as was mentioned in Section 3).
Additionally, it cannot be ruled out that the liquidity premium included in the price of the
indexed bond is higher than that estimated here if the degree of liquidity of these bonds
were lower than that of the STRIPs.
Summarising, the limited number of indexed bonds in the French market restricts the scope
to improve the break-even rate as a measure of inflation expectations. However, we can
calculate an inflation compensation measure, as Sack (2000) did for the U.S. market, that
overcomes some biases of the break-even rate, namely the biases induced by the different
cash-flow structures of the bonds (coupon bias) and the idiosyncratic effects of the
conventional bond (idiosyncratic bias). In the French case, the inflation compensation
measure proves to be very similar to the break-even rate. Even though the inflation
compensation measure improves the break-even rate, it may still incorporate an inflation-
risk premium embedded in conventional bond prices. Additionally, the existence of biases
due to the liquidity of indexed bonds and tax effects cannot be ruled out.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA / DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.011122
5. Comparing some inflation expectation measures
Figure 5 depicts the annual rate change of the French CPI (excluding tobacco), together
with three indicators of long-run inflation expectations: the inflation compensation measure,
the forecast from a univariate ARIMA model, and the consensus forecast, a measure from
survey data published by Consensus Economics. The time horizon of all of them is
approximately 10 years.
Comparison of these indicators reveals interesting differences in both the level and the
changes. According to the consensus forecast, long-run inflation expectations have
remained very stable. During 1999 and 2000 this indicator decreased slightly from 1.7% to
1.5%, and in the first half of 2001 it revised inflation expectations moderately upwards to
1.6%.
The inflation expectations derived from the univariate model are also very stable and their
fluctuations incorporate recent past movements in current inflation. In this way the increase
in inflation during 2000 is translated into a slight upward revision of inflation expectations
from approximately 1% to 1.3%.
Finally, the inflation compensation measure, computed as an average of its daily values,
reflects more volatile inflation expectations. During 1999 this indicator followed an upward
trend (from levels around 1% to 1.6%) coinciding with the increase in observed inflation15.
During 2000, this indicator remained relatively stable in spite of the increase in the current
inflation rate, and its levels were much closer to those derived from the consensus forecast.
Therefore, during 1999 and 2000, the consensus forecast considers the increase in
observed inflation as transitory (because it perhaps reflects transitory increases in energy
prices), while the other indicators find some persistent factors and reviewed long-term
expected inflation upwards. During 2000 the inflation compensation measure and the
consensus forecast indicate very similar levels of inflation expectations. Finally, at the
beginning of 2001, all indicators coincide in correcting the expected long-term inflation
upwards.
The greater variability of the inflation compensation measure might reflect, to some extent,
the fact that participants in financial markets revise their inflation expectations more
thoroughly than is inferred from the other indicators. This explanation is clear in the case of
the univariate model since the information set of the investors is much wider than the past
values of the CPI. Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out that the relatively greater volatility of
the inflation compensation measure was, to some extent, induced by some of the biases
                                                                
15 During the first part of the sample a case could be argued for the existence of a learning process and price discovery that
might have distorted the inflation expectations derived from the new French indexed-bond market.
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discussed in Section 3, like for example that associated with the inflation-risk premium,
liquidity differences or tax issues.
If, alternatively, we focus on estimating changes in inflation expectations, rather than their
levels, we can compare the inflation compensation measure with other indicators based on
the information provided by financial markets. Under some assumptions about the
behaviour of real interest rates, Mishkin (1990) proposed using the slope of the nominal
term structure as an indicator of changes in inflation expectations. When the slope of the
yield curve steepens (flattens) it is an indication that the inflation rate will rise (fall) in the
future. Alternatively, given that long-term real interest rates are supposed to be relatively
stable, the fluctuations in the yield on the 10-year nominal bond are also interpreted as
changes in inflation expectations.
Figure 8 tracks changes in long-term inflation expectations based on these three financial
indicators16: monthly changes in the slope of the term structure (slope indicator), monthly
changes in the yield on the 10-year nominal benchmark bond (yield indicator) and monthly
changes in the inflation compensation measure. The daily average is used in all cases. The
yield indicator is highly correlated with the inflation compensation measure, although the
size of the movements in inflation expectations are generally smaller in the case of the
inflation compensation measure, but the sign tends to coincide. There are two possible
explanations for these differences. On the one hand, they may reflect fluctuations in real
interest rates, which are incorporated into the yield indicator. On the other, as we saw in
Section 3, due to tax effects, the overestimation associated with the yield indicator is higher
than that of the inflation compensation measure. In the case of the slope indicator, it usually
coincides in sign with the other indicators, but there are some periods in which the message
is different. For example, during May 2000 the slope indicator predicted a strong reduction
in inflation expectations (while the other indicators predicted an increase). One explanation
for this contradictory message is the influence of expected movements in official interest
rates. During this period, the expected increase in official interest rates might have flattened
the slope of the yield curve. At the end of 2000 something similar occurs: expectations of a
cut in official interest rates may have increased the slope of the yield curve, reflecting, as a
consequence, a strong increase in expected inflation.
Figure 9 depicts changes in inflation expectations during the last six months according to
previous financial measures. From this perspective the evolution of these indicators is
smoother and it also reflects aforementioned differences. During 1999 all indicators predict
increases in inflation expectations, in year 2000, only the slope indicator shows quite strong
decreases in inflation expectations while according to the other indicators there are no
                                                                
16 For each month we calculate the average of the daily values of the slope of the term structure, the 10-year nominal yield
and the inflation compensation measure, respectively. Then the indicator of changes in inflation expectations is calculated as
monthly differences.
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changes. As already mentioned, this behaviour of the slope indicator may be induced
because this period was characterised by reductions in official interest rates.
In summary, the comparison of financial indicators of changes in inflation expectations
shows that the compensation measure is relatively smooth, and it is also useful for
measuring the level of inflation expectations. Although it may incorporate some biases it
seems to overestimate to a lesser extent changes in inflation expectations than the yield
measure, and it is not affected either by changes in real interest rates or by the expected
movements in official interest rates.
6. Conclusions
Long-term inflation expectations are relevant variables for monetary authorities, especially
for those with price stability goals. The break-even rate is a widely used measure of inflation
expectations that uses prices of indexed bonds. In this paper, we have seen that this
indicator is an unbiased estimator of inflation expectations under very restrictive
assumptions, which, in practice, are not fulfilled. The joint impact of potential biases is
difficult to establish, although the analysis made in this paper sheds some light on their
possible sign and size.
The literature on indexed bonds provides alternative methods to deal with the biases in the
break-even rate, but unfortunately the limited supply of indexed bonds in the French market
does not allow use of the most refined approaches. However, Sack (2000) proposed an
alternative indicator, which he called inflation compensation measure, that employs richer
information and avoids some of the biases included in the break-even rate such as (part of)
the coupon bias, the compound bias and the idiosyncratic effects of the 10-year
conventional bond. Under some conditions, this measure also avoids liquidity bias. Thus,
this alternative estimator improves the break-even rate as an estimator of long-term inflation
expectations.
In the French case, the inflation compensation measure proves to be very similar to the
break-even rate, suggesting that, in this sample, the joint impact of the biases controlled by
this alternative indicator is small.
The comparison of alternative measures of long-term inflation expectations, such as survey
statistics, or those derived from an univariate model, shows significant differences. For
example, the inflation compensation measure is more time-varying. This may be attributed
to the fact that investors revise inflation expectations more thoroughly or, on the other hand,
it could also partially reflect the potential biases of this measure. However, among financial
indicators, the inflation compensation measure seems to be more stable, and although it
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may incorporate some biases, it seems to reduce the impact of movements on real interest
rate, tax effects or market-expected movements in official interest rates that may distort
other financial indicators.
Thus, the analysis performed in this paper suggests that indexed bonds provide valuable
information on inflation expectations for monetary authorities. Nevertheless, caution is
required when interpreting the estimated inflation expectations since, at least potentially,
they may incorporate some biases. If these biases are quite stable, it would be better to
estimate changes in, instead of the levels of, inflation expectations. In any event, the
potential variability of these biases in the very short term suggests that it would be better not
to interpret changes in these indicators over very short periods of time.
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p= 0 % p= 2 % p= 5 % p= 0 % p= 2 % p= 5 %
Case I : t2=0
t1=0 % 0 0.07 0.18 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04
t1=10 % 0 0.30 0.75 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15
t1=30 % 0 0.96 2.39 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48
t1=40 % 0 1.45 3.63 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73
Case II : t2=0.5 t1
t1=10 % 0 0.19 0.49 1.09 1.10 1.10 1.15
t1=30 % 0 0.54 1.37 1.26 1.27 1.27 1.48
t1=40 % 0 0.80 2.04 1.39 1.40 1.41 1.73
Case III : t2=t1
t1=10 % 0 0.08 0.22 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.15
t1=30 % 0 0.12 0.35 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.48
t1=40 % 0 0.14 0.45 1.06 1.07 1.09 1.73
(a) These estimations include the bias induced by the compound effects. t1 and t2 are, respectively, the
marginal tax rates on interest income and capital gains, p is the expected inflation rate. The real rate of
interest is set at 3.5%
Yield on 
conventional 
bond
Bias in the level 
(percentage points)
Sensitivity to changes in the inflation rate
Break-even rate
TABLE 1
Estimation of the tax bias (a)
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Long-term 
nominal 
interest rate 
Slope (-b1)
(perc.points)
0 3 -3
3             -10.3          -4.3          -16.8          
0             0.0          6.2          -6.7          
-3             11.3          17.8          4.5          
6             -25.1          -19.0          -31.6          
0             0.0          6.6          -7.0          
-6             30.8          37.8          23.3          
(a) The term structure is assumed to follow the Nelson & Siegel model with b2=0 and t=4. The estimates are
made using the characteristics of the 10-year conventional and indexed French bonds in July 1999.
Term structure of real interest rates assumption
Long-term real interest rate b0= 3.5%
Term structure of    
nominal interest rate
5 %
10 %
Slope (-b1) (perc.points)
basis points
TABLE 2
Estimation of the duration bias included in the break-even rate (a)
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Source of bias Expression Sign (a) Size(b.p.) Assumptions (b)
Compound effect pr + 5
Expected inflation: 1.5 %
Real interest rate: 3.5 %
Inflation lag (pl - p)(1 + r) / (1+ pl)  +/-  +/- 2
Mean deviation of the CPI with its three
month lag considering an horizon of 10
years.
Taxes (c)
(t1 - t2 + pt1) p /
(1 - t1)(1 +p)
+ 7
Expected inflation: 2 %
Tax rate: 40 %
Inflation risk 
aversion
(1 + p) gn + N.A.
Liquidity  -gi - -1
STRIPs and indexed bonds share the same
liquidity
Coupon effect (pdi - pT) + (idc - idi)  +/-  -4 a -10
Observed nominal interest rates
Slope of real term structure between 0 and
3 p.p.
Asymmetry in the 
compensation
+ small Low probability of deflation
(a) Inflation expectations are assumed to be positive. + (-) indicates that the break-even rate overestimates
(underestimates) inflation expectations.
(b) Assumptions used to estimate the size of the bias.
(c) The positive sign is derived assuming that the marginal tax rate for capital gains is less or equal to the marginal
tax rate on interest income. The estimated size of the bias assumes that these rates are equal.
TABLE 3
Summary of the biases of the break-even rate
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Source: French Treasury.
Sources: Bloomberg and Reuters.
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Long-term inflation expectations derived from indexed-bond prices
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Breakdown of the difference between the break-even rate and the inflation 
compensation measure
FIGURE 5
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An estimation of liquidity bias
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Sources: French Treasury and Consensus Economics.
Long-term inflation expectations and actual inflation
FIGURE 7
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Source: Bloomberg.
Source: Bloomberg.
Financial indicators of monthly changes in long-term inflation expectations
FIGURE 8
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Financial indicators of half-year changes in long-term inflation expectations
FIGURE 9
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